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Terror seems to be a brute and speechless act that defies verbalization. Acts 
of terror can be told and retold, described and analyzed. They are deeds of 
violence. The performative qualities of terror seem to be restricted to utter 
destruction, plain and simple. Butthat is not the case with terrorism. Ter-
rorism follows an indirect ßtrategy to motivate others. These may be the 
masses, the underclass, minorities or majorities. Terrorism addresses these 
groups to violently oppose certain characteristics of the political, social or 
cultural system of a given society. Terrorism has a political dimension. The 
use of bombs or hand grenades itself is terror, but terrorism goes beyond 
that. Terrorism is a strategy that relies heavily on communication among 
terrorists and also between terrorists and the surrounding society. "Terror-
ism is fundamentally a social factrather than a brute fact" (Jackson 247). 
The contemporary approach of Critical Terrorism Studies uses terrorism as 
an object that teils us something about the society in which it takes place 
or about the cultural, political, or economic environment. This critical ap-
proach toward terrorism is quite different from the traditional way in which 
terrorism has been studied. Historiographical research on terrorism was in 
that older understanding "counterinsurgency masquerading as political sci-
ence," as one observer put it (Schulze Wessel361). It was centered araund 
actors and tried to define strategies to prevent terrorism and therefore ter-
rorists from acting. 
What is terrorism seen from the perspective of historiography? How 
can we define it? Broadly speaking, terrorism involves at least three com-
ponents that are combined in different ways: violence, the state and ille-
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gitimacy. Many follow the definition Peter Chalk has given. Terrorism is 
for him "the systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by 
sub-state actors as a means of achieving specific political objectives, these 
goals differing according to the group concerned" (Chalk 151). This def-
inition has the advantage that it leaves open the wide range of ideology 
that motivates terrorists. Others take the indirect political strategy as the 
defining characteristic of terrorism that sets it apart from other uses of 
political violence. Alex P. Schmid and Albert Jongman define terrorism 
"as an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi-)clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, crim-
inal or political reasons, whereby '- in contrast to assassination - the direct 
targets of violence are not the main targets" (Schmid and Jongman 28). 
These targets just serve as "message generators." Terrorism is therefore a 
"threat- and violence-based communication process" (28). 
Recently, the analysis of terrorism has deve1oped two alternative strate-
gies of definition, both inspired by the terrorism of the late 20th and early 
2 pt centuries, particularly the lslamic terror of 9111. Both try to show new 
paths and dimensions of research on terrorism. The first trend refers to the 
"new terrorism" after 1979, when the Iranian revolution took place, and 
particularly after 9/11. Religiously motivated political violence stands at 
the center of its agenda. Terrorism is here linked to ideology and religion. 
A second school, Critical Terrorism Studies, points to the subservient role 
of this kind of analysis to state affairs and counterinsurgency. Scholars of 
this school follow Antonio Gramsei and conceptualize both the state and 
terrorists as actors i:t:f a political struggle. The Critical Terrorism Studies ap-
proach is trying to understand what the presence of terrorism tells us about 
the operation of the larger cultural, economic and political system around 
it. Analytical research on terrorism has to distance itself from the state and 
its imperatives. Terrorismjs primarily used as a lens to understand the sur-
rounding society. "Most terrorism occurs in the context of wider political 
struggles in which the use of terror is one strategy among other core rou~ 
tine forms of contentious action. In this sense terrorism is not a freestanding 
phenomenon: there is no terrorism as such, just the instrumental use of ter-
ror by actors" (Jackson 248).1 
See Richard Jackson, "Introduction: The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies." Euro-
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Some scholars have compared terrorism studies with cultural anthropol-
ogy. "Terrorism studies' natives are the terrorists, and its goal is to describe 
and explain a particular terrorist group's social structure, its culture and 
motivations, and last but not least its practices" (Hülsse and Spencer 575). · 
Terrorism scholars have used different methods to analyze the ideology and 
the practices of terrorists. One of these methods focuses on discourses, not 
between the actors, but rather more generally in a Foucaultian sense in the 
terrorist milieu. Seen from this standpoint, discursive practices inform the 
individual acts. The social production of terrorism is linked to metaphors 
that provide an understanding of the political field and of politics in gen-
eral. Here literary studies come into play. Their techniques to describe and 
analyze discourses help us understand the mental maps of terrorism. 
Terrorism seen through the lens of literary studies looks at these ideo-
logical ways to legitimize terrorism. The linguistic turn in historiography 
has taken our interest to the field of imagination and semantics, to cultural 
constructions in language and images. The cultural and linguistic construc-
tion goes beyond the methodology ofliterary studies.2 lt concerns the politi-
cal, cultural and economic, even religious dimension of ideology. No matter 
how we look at terrorism, whether through the lens of literary studies, po-
litical history or cultural construction, terrorism has certain characteristics. 
First and foremost its logical structure is highly binary, even Manichaean 
and dichotomous. The mental set of terrorism is based on a logical struc-
ture that presupposes that good causes stand against evil ones. Terrorism's 
ontology and political ideology correspond to each other. Terrorism has a 
purpose in a world that is structured. Random violence is no terror, even 
if it resembles terror from an outsider's view. The good cause provides a 
purpose worth fighting (and dying) for. Dichotomous worldviews provide 
the terrorist with a clear view of who is an enemy and who isn't. They 
identify friend and foe. At the same time they provide the terrorist with a 
pean Political Science 6 (2007): 225-27; Jeroen Gunning, "A Case for Critical Terror-
ism Studies." Govemment and Opposition 43 (2007): 363-93; Marie Breen Smyth, "A 
Critical Research Agenda for the Study of Political Terror." European Political Science 
6 (2007): 260-67; Ruth Blakeley, "Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies." 
European Political Science 6 (2007): 228-35; Schulze Wessel (364). 
2 See Alex Houen, Terrorism and Modem Literature: From Joseph Conrad to Ciaran 
Carson. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. 
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motivation to act. This binary ontology can be found in linguistic as weil as 
iconographic structures. The political imaginary that terrorism is based on 
looms large in its texts, films, and its general imagery. 
The dichotomy of freedom versus oppression is probably one of the 
most infiuential binary worldviews. This binary organizes the mindset and 
the conception of reality among the various brands of terrorism. Among the 
decolonization movements of the 20th century this binary concept of reality 
is patently obvious.3 But it also holds true for terrorism in the 19th century. 
Ireland and Poland provide examples. What Iooks like a terrorist from one 
side is a liberating hero from the other. The Fenian Brotherhood fought -
although less violently than the IRA - agairist the British landowners in 
Ireland. Whenever we use the term "boycott" we refer implicitly to Charles 
Cunningham Boycott, a landowner in Ireland, against whom the protests 
of the Irish Land League were directed in 1879. In Poland the cause of 
freedom provided justification for the rebellions in 1830/31 and 1863/64. 
Yet there is no deterrninism built into this mental structure. Freedom 
fighters don't have to be terrorists. They often choose other means to 
achieve their goal. In order to use terrorist violence other variables come 
into the fray of analysis. Various reasons have been adduced to legitimize 
terror in modern European history. In what follows, I shall concentrate on 
two additional binaries that enact the guiding polarity of freedom versus 
oppression: 
- virtue versus vices: the virtue of a collective fights the vices resulting 
from the Iack of virtue within the same collective or another. 
- the secret versus the public: the clandestine cell of a terrorist group ver-
sus a repressive political superstructure that dominates the public sphere. 
The terrorist cell is in-group oriented and in violent opposition to a su-
perstructure, be it the administration or the secret service of a perceived 
enemy. 
1. Virtue versus vices. The terror of the Jacobins 
The French Revolution was not only a caesura in the history of nationalism 
but also in that of terrorism. It created a new and powerful ideological moti-
3 See David Anderson, Histones of the Hanged: Britain 's Dirty War in Kenya and the 
End ofthe Empire. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005. 
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vation for political terrorism. After France had declared war on the Central 
European monarchies on 20 April 1792, the outcome was by far unsure and 
many even within France expected the revolutionaries to lose the war. The 
ensuing radicalization of the revolution - Fran~ois Furet termed it a "dera-
page"4 - used terror to win the war by strengthening the national will. The 
protagonists of this strategy in the era of the National Convention in 1793 
and 1794 were Maximilien de Robespierre and Jean-Paul Marat, at a cer-
tain pointalso Antoine de Saint-Just. Robespierre combined two concepts 
that were usually seen as opposites: He favored a "despotism of liberty" to 
rescue liberty from its enemies. In his report on the "Principles of political 
morality" on February 5, 1794, he wrote: 
When the despot uses terror to govem his brutalized subjects, he is right as a 
despot; when you use terror to daunt the enemies of liberty, you are right as 
founders of the Republic. The govemment of the Revolution is the despotism of 
liberty over tyranny. Wasforce meant only to protect crime? (Lyman and Spitz 72) 
The Jacobins saw the revolutionary project under attack from outside and 
from within. This was certainly true. Accor.dingly, the Jacobin Ieaders tried 
to win the war and at the same time to reconstruct French society. Despite 
the many early military setbacks of the revolutionary troops in 1792 they 
steadfastly combined these two tasks: external mobilization required inter-
nal homogenization. 
This could firstly be read as simply eradicating their enemies by way 
of terror. Indeed the guillotine served in this way. The enemies of the rev-
olution and counter-revolutionaries were their first targets. The Vendee in 
Western France and Lyon suffered immensely from the terror of the Paris 
Jacobins.5 The terreur of the early years went along with rumors about the 
enemies of the revolution within France, e.g. poisoning doctors in service 
to the wealthy or the shortage of grain as a result of counter-revolutionary 
intervention. A closer reading of the Jacobin terror proves secondly that it 
was part of a vision for a new society and a new man. At the core of the new 
society stood virtue, which was to be achieved by terror. The dichotomy of 
4 For Furet's notion of "derapage," seeErnst Schulin, Die Französiche Revolution. 4th ed. 
München: Beck, 2004, esp. pp. 49-52. 
5 See Mona Ozouf, "War and Terror in French Revolutionary Discourse (1792-1794)." 
Journal of Modem History 56 (1984): 579-97. 
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virtue versus vices became particularly prominent in 1793. Jacob L. Tal-
mon and his followers identified the era of the National Convention as the 
defining moment of the modern dictatonal state, more precisely the use of 
violent force by the state against its internal enemies. Terrorism of the state 
in the 20th century had its ideological precursors in the radical phase of 
the French Revolution. 6 The years 1793 and 1794 saw "the experiment of 
coupling the idea of national sovereignty of France to a regime of direct 
popular democracy" (Hont 201). This "produced not a re-publique, but a 
re-totale," a phrase coined by Sieyes (201). For Jacob L. Talmon, Jacobin 
policies paved the way for modern totalitarianism in the 20th century. 
From early on in 1790 la terreur was an answer to the anti-revolutionary 
~orces, where aristocrats, Catholics, and their foreign allied partners played 
1mportant roles. The Revue de Paris wrote in the autumn of 1790: "Le 
peuple est terrible dans ses punitions. L' aristocratie est barbare dans ces 
vengeances. Comparons maintenant. La terreur s'attache aux coups de l'un 
et de l'autre parti" (van den Heuvel 101). "La terreur" understood in this 
way was a defense strategy of the revolution. For the long tradition of pro-
revolutionary historiography "la terreur" could be justified and had explana-
tory power for the rise of the French nation.7 
But the rhetoric and imagery of "la terreur" went beyond the classi-
cal topos of defense at all costs. Jean-Paul Marat radicalized the classical-
republican language from early on. The people's will could only be found 
in a unitary and indivisible will, according to Marat. Otherwise crisis and 
internal tensions would prevent the revolution from building a republic. Ex-
ternal attacks on tlie-revolution and internal conftict made homogeneity and 
the elimination of heterogeneity all the more urgent for Marat. Exclusion 
was achieved through the use of the guillotine against internal enemies, 
real or suspected. The political use of the guillotine made it the "crescent 
of equality." On December 18, 1790, Marat wrote in his Ami du peuple: 
Six months ago, five or six hundred heads would have been enough to pull you 
back ~rom the abyss. Today because you have stupidly let your implacable enemies 
conspue among themselves and gather strength, perhaps we will have to cut offfive 
6 See Jacob. L. Talmon, The origins of totalitarian democracy. London: Secker & War-
burg, 1955. 
7 See particularly Ferdinand Brunot, Histoire de la Langue franqaise des origines a 1900. 
Vol. IX: La Revolution et l'Empire. Paris: Colin, [1933] 1967. 
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or six thousand. But even if it need twenty thousand, there is no time for hesitation. 
(Donnachie and Carmen 83) 
For the claim to achieve absolute unity, numbers didn't mean much. The 
skyrocketing numbers of those suspected and put to the guillotine were 
proof of the permanent instability of "la terreur." Marat, Robespierre, and 
the radical Jacobins could never be sure that their measures would bring 
about a unified France. The suspicion-driven politics produced constantly 
new enemies. More and more enemies - internal as well as external - were 
discovered. In November 1793, Marat was quoted in the National Con-
vention as saying: "Sacrifice 200,000 heads, and you will save a million" 
(Baker 47).-Marat could refer to these extraordinarily high numbers without 
any moral second thoughts. He instead pointed to the millians of victims of 
the monarchical system over the centuries. A few hundred thousand victims 
of the terreur would always be less than the result of a thousand years of 
monarchy. Marat and his followers thereby popularized the notion that the 
Revolution had no reallimits but only enemies (Furet 67). 
While Marat looked at terror as a me8!1S to achieve absolute national 
unity, Robespierre looked at terror more from the perspective of justice 
and political philosophy: Only if terreur was linked to justice could it be 
justified. In his famous speech on terror before the National Convention in 
February 1794, Robespierre explained: 
If the mainspring of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the mainspring of 
popular government in revolution is virtue and terror both: Virtue, without which 
terror is disastrous; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing but 
prompt, severe, inflexible justice; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so 
much a specific principle as a consequence of the general principle of democracy 
applied to the homeland's most pressing needs. (Law 63) 
The close connection of virtue and terror ensured for Robespierre that ter-
ror was used politically and not as a means to settle individual accounts 
between citizens. The political discourse could therefore refer to "la ter-
reur" as "vengeance populaire" (Clay 110). 
Louis Antoine de Saint-Just was another protagonist and spokesperson 
for this radicalized version of a transformation of society by way of terror. 
He constantly defended the use of terror in the National Convention. As a 
radical foliower of Rousseau he advocated the purification of public morals, 
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since only a homogeneaus morality could serve as a basis for the common 
weal. On March, 17, 1794, Saint-Just demanded violent measures to bury 
the monarchy under its own debris. His strictly political and Rousseauian 
reading of terror was designed to defend the "rights of the people and the 
Convention" to rigidly police the state and protect the judges who severely 
punish those who depart from the decrees. Terror must be used politically 
in defense of the republic and in contempt of wealth. The use of violence 
and the guillotine by the Convention "is virtue and not fury . . . Let Revo-
lutionists be Romans, not Tartars," Saint-Just declared on March, 17, 1794 
in the National Convention (Curtis 228). This decidedly Romanattitude to 
give everything for the common weal runs through the rest of his speech. 
The love for the fatherland sacrifices everything for the public interest, it is 
without pity and has no respect even for human rights. 
This kind of terror by the leading J acobins was essentially a top-down 
project, a justification for a moral dictatorship. In accordance with Roman 
political philosophy, the Jacobins established even the idea of a temporary 
dictatorship to save the state and the republic by force. Besides attacking the 
(seemingly obvious) enemies ofthe French Revolution, their dictatonal rule 
between 1793 and 1794 was directed against those who were lukewarm or 
indifferent toward the revolution and thereby constituted a threat to the war 
effort and domestic homogeneity. The guillotine was used as an instrument 
to establish a society that was morally in step with the revolution and with 
the war effort. The problern of this strategy - as with most terrorisms - was 
that it did not provide an exit option or sense offinality. When the Jacobins 
radicalized their (erreur and tumed on their former allies among the leading 
Jacobin circles, these fought back. On the 9th of Thermidor in the year II, 
otherwise known as July 27, 1794, Robespierre and Saint-Just went to the 
guillotine with the other Jacobin leaders. From then on the Thermidor has 
been the term to describe the end of any revolutionary terror. Referring to 
the Thermidor of a revolution means using a metaphor for the closing of 
terror.8 
If we follow Jacob L. Talmon, this binary of virtue versus vices consti-
tuted a role model that was practiced throughout the totalitarian regimes of 
8 See Bronislaw Baczko (ed.), Comment sortir de la Terreur: Thermidor et la Revolution. 
Paris: Gallimard, 1989. 
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the 20th century. The French re-publique tumed into a re-totale. The total-
itarian model of the French Revolution could easily be transferred to other 
totalitarian ideologies, particularly racism and communism. Talmon devel-
oped the concept of the "totalitarian democracy" by associating two terms 
that weren't connected before. The totalitarian democracy is based on polit-
ical messianism and the absence of confiict resolution. It refuses to accept 
pluralism as the basis of democracy. Instead, it is based on a political ontol-
ogy and a strong hierarchy. In practice this allows the use of force against 
those who do not voluntarily accept this pre-existing political order.9 
2. The secret and the public: Terror, cell, and superstructure 
Another long-term structuring binary was the Opposition between minority 
and majority. Modem terrorism- particularly in the decolonization era-
was built on this model. Even contemporary terrorism is based on the mo-
tivation to counter a more powerful and technically advanced enemy. The 
fight of clandestine groups against a superior enemy followed the path of 
the partisan strategy and the minority versus majority model. 10 
The formative period of this terrorist strategy was the Napoleonic and 
post-Napoleonic period. The Italian secret society "Carboneria" spread all 
over Central Europe. It derived from the tradition of the French Revolution, 
particularly from Fran~ois-Noel, called Gracchus Babeuf, but its terrorism 
was different. The motivation of its at least 24,000 members came from an 
extremely egalitarian, democratic and republican nationalism and was di-
rected against the autocratic forces of the Habsburg monarchy under its first 
minister Metternich and his Italian allies. Uprisings, assassinations, and in-
dividual acts of terror were aimed against the ancien regime of the Bour-
bons in Naples and other ruling families. Their political strategy was the 
putsch, which they used regularly, starting prominently in 1820 and 1821 
in the "Two Sicilies insurrection." The Carbonari were mostly nobles who 
9 See Klaus Hornung, "Politischer Messianismus: Jacob Talmon und die Genesis der to-
talitären Diktaturen." Die offene Flanke der Freiheit. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
2001. 39-84. 
IO See Herfried Münkler, "Asymmetrische Gewalt. Terrorismus als politisch-militärische 
Strategie." Über den Krieg. Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer theoreti-
schen Reflexion. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2002. 252-64. 
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tried to get on top of the politicalladder. The reconstruction of society - that 
was the telling difference to "la terreur" between 1793 und 1794 - had been 
postponed after the ascendancy to power. 11 Clandestine cells of Iikeminded 
nationalists around Filippo Buonarotti used terror against the superstruc-
ture of the bureaucratic-monarchical state. The objective was taking over 
the state, not restructuring the society. The revolutions in Naples in July 
1820 andin Piedmont 1823 served as examples of a highly motivated cell 
trying to violently bring down a superstructure that prevented the Italian 
nation state from coming into existence. 
The mental map originating from the binary of cell and superstructure 
explained the impact of secret societies in post-Napoleonic Europe, which 
stood in the tradition of the French Revolution. This "revolution under 
cover" could be found foremost in Germany and Italy in societies Iike the 
Delphic Society, the Friends of Virtue, the Republican Brothers Proteetors 
and ~e Society of the Black Pin. Their key aims were politicalliberty, legal 
equal1ty, and economic opportunity. All of these goals were to be achieved 
through a democratic nation-state. The Carbonari inspired themselves on 
the model of the Bavarian Illuminati, an early modern Freemason society, 
more than on the Jacobins. Fully antireligious, anticlerical and egalitarian, 
the Carbonari associated with the Freemasons, who kept to the tradition of 
secrecy. The Carbonari called each other "good cousins" ("buoni cugini"). 
Unlike the Freemasons, secrecy was for Buonarotti and his followers not a 
goal per se, but rather an instrumenttobring down the autocratic monar-
chies through the creation of open chaos. Already Babeuf had said: "Let 
everything return to chaos and outofthat chaos may arise a new and regen-
e_rated world" (Jaszi and Lewis 67). The spread of the secret societies gave 
nse to vast conspiracy theories on the side of the monarchical authorities. 
The secrecy of the terrorist cells and the conspiracy theories of the ruling 
classes reassured and stabilized each other. 
The tradition of secrecy and clandestine operations was also a charac-
teristic of anarchism, which was influential in Italy and beyond. The anar-
chists' motivation was not the building of a nation state, but the downfall of 
~e state and even of statehood. This meant in practice not the implementa-
tiOn of a putsch strategy and the takeover of the state, but rather insurrection 
11 See Eugen Lenhoff (ed.), Politische Geheimbünde. München: Amalthea, 1966. 
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and the overthrow of institutions of statehood. Anarchists had social and po-
litical change in mind when they used terror. Carlo Pisacane was one ofthe 
early Italian anarchists. He did not advocate propaganda by conviction and 
argumentation, but a strategy of "propaganda by the deed" ("propaganda 
dei fatti"). Terror was for him not the result of a rational argument, but an 
argument itself. He wrote in his political testament in 1857: 
The propaganda by the idea is a chimera, the education of the people is an absur-
dity. Ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former, and the people will not 
be free when they are educated, but will be educated when they are free. The only 
work a citizen can undertake for the good of the country is that of cooperating with 
the material revolution; therefore, conspiracies, plots, attempts, etc., are that series 
of deeds by which Italy proceeds to her goal. (Cahm 76) 
The legacy of secrecy and conspiracy was nowhere to be feit more strongly 
than in Bastern Europe and its empires. Empires were by definition not 
based on any sort of national or egalitarian principles. The imperial nobil-
ity, the military, the police, the crown and the church stood for everything 
terrorists fought against. This was the case in Austrian-dominated Italy in 
the early 19th century as weil as in the Balkans in the late 19th century and 
in Poland under Russian aegis. 
The most ardent followers of this strategy of "propaganda by the deed" 
were tobe found among Russian anarchists, particularly among the Narod-
naja volia (People's Will). This revolutionary group used terror to trigger a 
revolution, to give Russia a constitution and to transfer factories and land 
to the peasants. They understood themselves as active terrorists. They are 
best known for their assassination of Tsar Alexander II on March 1, 1881.12 
Their strategy was indirect, not direct as with the French Jacobins. Killing 
state offleials would Iead the state to massive retaliation, which then would 
ignite the masses to revolt and overturn the political system. 
It was Leon Trotsky who transforrned the terrorism of the 19th century 
into that of the 20th century. He broke with the concept of individual terror 
and the secrecy of terror. Terror, he observed, had so far been used by ter-
12 For an in-depth analysis of this assassination, see Carola Dietze and Benjamin 
Schenk, "Traditionelle Herrscher in moderner Gefahr. Soldatisch-aristokratische Tu-
gendhaftigkeit und das Konzept der Sicherheit im späten 19. Jahrhundert." Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft 35 (2009): 368-401. 
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rorists instead of the masses. More generally, terrorism in the 19th century 
had not come to the core of revolutionary politics: the masses. In 1909 he 
criticized the Narodnaia volia as essentially having no revolutionary class 
behind it. He identified the problern of the masses behind clandestine ter-
rorism. Terror was only legitimate if it was used in the name and the interest 
ofthe masses. While 19th-century terrorists had acted instead ofthe masses, 
terror was for Trotsky only legitimate if used together with the masses. Ter-
rorism was too absolute a form of political struggle to let it play a limited 
and subordinate role in the party. Terrorism should instead be understood 
as the central form of class struggle. 
Trotsky's repositioning of terrorism within his radical political strat-
egy had lasting consequences. Trotsky insisted that terror should be used 
with the masses, not instead of the masses, an approach he accused former 
terrorists in Russia and elsewhere of pursuing. He radicalized the terrorist 
strategy. Terror with the masses effectively meant the use of terror through 
the party of the masses, i.e. the Communist Party. The Party has the legiti-
mate power to use terror. Terror was a legitimate tool to reconstruct society 
in the name of the masses. Trotsky defended terror against the German So-
cial Democrat Karl Kautsky, who had criticized Trotsky for the political 
use ofterror in the Russian civil war after 1919. According to Trotsky, War 
Communism after 1918 had to use terror in order to defend the revolution. 13 
The workers were to be militarized. Deserters were to be imprisoned in a 
camp. Trotsky laid out a program for a political and revolutionary terror. 
3. The nationai inoment of terrorism 
The defining metaphors and mental binaries of modern terrorism developed 
in a setting that was defined by nation building, nationalism and counter-
nationalism. Nationalism provided for the defining moment of modern ter-
rorism. From the perspective of the political agenda of a state-seeking or 
state-destroying terrorism new questions and perspectives arise, since ter-
rorism has gone beyond that setting. Historically, terrorism has acted in 
given and territorially demarcated societies. Even the conspiratorial and 
13 See David Dallin and George Denicke, "The period of war communism and the civil 
war." The Mensheviks: From the Revolution of 1917 to the Second World War. Ed. 
Leopold H. Haimson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. 93-239. 
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clandestine. groups in the late 19th century had a limited reach. Terrorism 
affected national or subnational societies. This has fundamentally changed 
today, since terrorism has succeeded in going global and developing strate-
gies that affect the global dimension of politics and economy. But does this 
mean that terrorism in our days is absolutely different from its origins in 
the 19th and early 20th centuries? 
There are arguments for continuities and for discontinuities. The two 
leading binaries of terrorism, virtue versus vices and secrecy versus the 
public, are still in place and work on a globallevel. The difference is that the 
performative aspect of terrorism-is now largely absent save for the extrem-
ist Islarnic terrorism and the Jihad ideology. Global terrorism has adopted 
an instrumental approach; i.e., to use terrorist means to achieve something 
else. From an inside perspective, it is not the terror as such that creates a 
religiously orthodox society, but God, who is the main actor in that drama. 
On the other side, the instrumental approach of contemporary terrorism 
does not mean that the use of terror is a means to extract resources and 
money. Obviously, ideologies matter within the world of terrorism as much 
or more than they did 200 years ago. This holds true for the complex rela-
tionship between religion and violence.14 But is goes beyond that, if we look 
at forms of political terrorism that defend independence globally. Accord-
ingly, the self-empowering formulas of terrorism to use violence haven't 
changed that much. Even for global terrorism the most important binary 
is still freedom versus oppression. The oppressors are no Ionger the state 
govemments and apparatuses but rather institutions of more than national 
significance: international cooperations, embassies, religions. 
But there are also discontinuities. The globalization of terrorism has 
made it the object of state warfare. What historically was set apart - wars 
were fought by states, terror used by terrorists - became more and more 
intertwined, as states countered the terrorists' ability to attack their institu-
tions and their military globally. The fronts got blurred since govemments 
14 From the plethora of books after 9/11, see Wolfgang Palaver, Aufgeklärte Apokalyptik. 
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use informal channels and their surveillance capacities to counter the ter-
rorist threat. We experience the end of wars as we knew them. What we see 
instead are highly complex police operations, but no wars between enemies 
that can be distinguished along their unifonns and national sovereignty. 15 
The "war on terror" by the U.S. government against the Islamic terrorists 
around Al-Qaeda is the latest step in a Ionger process blurring the lines 
between state and non-state violence. There are several reasons for these 
shifting metaphors, experiences, enemies and therefore, of course, pol-
icy options (Hülsse and Spencer 581). Historically, 19th-century terrorism 
had fought for national autonomy against the oppression of monarchical-
bureaucratic condominia or imperial domination. Ideology-driven terror-
ism in the 21st century is no Ionger fighting forthat goal, but for hegemony. 
Hegemony is the political goal of Muslim as well as Hindu or right-wing 
Christian or Jewish terrorist nationalism. What they encounter is the demo-
cratic nation state. 
And here lie probably the most important differences between historical 
and contemporary fonnations of terrorism. The reaction of the capitalist-
democratic nation states cannot be the same as that of the absolute monar-
chies in post -N apoleonic Europe. The hegemonic position of the rule of law 
and of human rights would be hurt if contemporary nation states or interna-
tional organizations were to use the same drastic violence as the terrorists. 
It is the vulnerability of democratic open societies that open up so many 
opportunities for their enemies. 
The globalization of terror also affects the concept of terror itself. In the 
era of the nation·~lates after the Napoleonic period, terrorism was identified 
by its actors and practices. This no Ionger holds true on a global scale in 
our days. What is terrorism in the 2P1 century? What certain societies in 
the West see as terrorism looks from a different standpoint like self-defense 
by violent means. And ir is this ambivalence of terrorism in the 21st century 
that makes it so familiar with the origins of modern terrorism in the French 
Revolution. While in the era of the nation states between 1830 and the 
downfall of communism an actor-centered concept of terrorism stood at the 
15 See Michael Naumann et al. (eds.), Ritter, Tod und Teufel- Krieg, Terror, Pandemien 
(Kursbuch 162). Hamburg: ZEIT-Verlag Bucerius, 2005. 
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center of terrorism studies, this is no Ionger the case. Terrorism as a political 
project and ideology is back- as in the days of "la terreur." 
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